a few thoughts...

on the "Obama Doctrine"

2011-04-11T10:03:00.000-07:00

There is a lot of discussion about how the "Obama Doctrine" differs from the "Bush Doctrine." While I'm not sure that it yet qualifies as a “doctrine,” and seems like more of a case-by-case approach, the Obama administration's foreign policy in many respects is certainly quite different than the Bush approach.

The “Bush Doctrine” sought expansive ends, such as the democratic transformation of an entire region and the defeat of global terrorism; and it authorized preemptive war as means to these ends. The Obama administration has yet to articulate such a grand strategy.

Further, Obama's foreign policy decisions are being made in a very different international context. The US position in the world is quite different than when Bush launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

To begin with, the US is mired in an economic slump, and weary of war. This constrains foreign policy decision making. The American public is highly skeptical of spending money on military intervention abroad, when there are pressing financial concerns at home. Furthermore, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have made Americans far more skeptical of military intervention (public support for the mission in Afghanistan is only around 40%). Thus, broad ideological aims, such as "democratization," are far less likely to be seen as in the "national interest."

Perhaps more importantly, however, because of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US is already stretched militarily. Thus, preemptive action is less of an option than when Bush articulated his "doctrine," in 2002. Although US military capabilities are unmatched, they are not infinite.

Further, France and Britain dragged the US into a shooting war instead of the reverse. This is also partially due to the fact that the US is already heavily committed militarily. However, by seeking to enhance the legitimacy of the UNSC, rather than contesting its legitimacy, Obama seems far more committed to multilateralism than Bush.

More importantly, the US is effectively reacting to events in the Middle East, rather than catalyzing events there. The Obama administration is making decisions based upon actions by the people of in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, etc.; rather than forcing their governments to react to US actions.

For these reasons, and others, the Obama foreign policy approach is inherently different than the Bush approach. It is more multilateral, and far more reactive rather than proactive. The grand-strategy of the Bush administration was transforming the world in US interests; however, Obama's seems to be to preserve US interests in a changing world.

on the violence today in Egypt

2011-02-02T07:29:00.000-08:00

I just saw the anti-Mubarak protesters building walls on the streets to keep back the pro-Mubarak people throwing rocks at them.

Neither the military nor the police is stepping in between the sides. Using bullets seems out of the question.

The protesters will have to defend themselves. They ultimately seem to have far greater numbers, and are building defensible perimeters.

However, they have no access to ambulances, which will be necessary for many of the injuries caused by the violence. And they are surrounded.

Regardless of what the military demands, however, the protesters seem committed to staying.

Is there anything you think the US can do to help? (see previous post for some thoughts from myself and others)

egypt and u.s.

2011-01-31T12:31:00.000-08:00

What should "we" do about the uprising in Egypt?

Some suggest keeping relatively silent and letting the events in Egypt be controlled by Egyptians. Others argue that the U.S. government should effectively declare its support of the overthrow of the current Mubarak regime. Many suggest something of a middling position, in which the U.S. privately coerces Mubarak to leave peacefully while publicly saying relatively little beyond support for abstract democratic values.

Absent in much of the discussion seems to be what sort of leverage the U.S. actually has over the situation. There seems to be little leverage over the majority of Egyptian citizens. Much of the protest directly stems from the past three decades of U.S. Egyptian policy, which effectively amounted to subsidizing Egyptian security forces. These security forces agreed to allow access of the U.S. military, aid U.S. intelligence activities in the region, and recently help interrogate and sometimes torture Al Qaeda suspects. In return, the U.S. effectively turned a blind eye to Egyptian security forces being used to oppress domestic opposition groups. This did not go unnoticed in Egypt and beyond, and U.S. support of another authoritarian regime became evidence of imperialism. This support, however, also gives the U.S. a degree of leverage over the Egyptian military.

How should the U.S. use this leverage? One idea might be to privately tell the top military officials that they must pave the way for a legitimate national unity government and or new constitutional convention, or risk losing aid. While publicly saying that the U.S. looks forward to cooperating with the will of the Egyptian people as represented through a free and fair electoral process. It might be made clear that the U.S. does not seek to guide this process in any way.

What do you think?

on religion and politics, by Julian Arevalo...

2009-12-03T08:13:00.000-08:00

On Politics and Religion

Another two articles on religion in this week’s The Economist. The shortest of them about the increased interest of Anglicans for the Catholic Church given the increased liberalism that their church is experiencing, versus the tight set of rules of the one from Rome; the latter, no wonder, is happily welcoming those looking for something more conservative.

The other article ‘Misionary Positions’, talks about the intermittency of British politicians in terms of their involvement with religion. First of all it describes the reluctance of most top British politicians to be identified with religious creeds which is, of course, a response to the high rates of agnosticism and atheism among the British. However, it also mentions the interest of both, conservatives and labour in looking towards religion for political ideas; i.e, those values traditionally linked to religions’ agendas like the welfare state, revival of the civil society, family integration and the fight against poverty, are now occupying important places in those parties’ agendas. The situation resembles a prisoner’s dilemma: given that the other party finds a major source of ideology in religion, it’s better for my party to follow suit and resort to religion too; the outcome, obviously, is worse for both parties than what they would have achieved if not constrained by the other’s actions.

The article closes by saying: “But in a country where profound social problems have survived a decade of massive state spending, politicians could be forgiven for looking beyond secular technocracy for answers”.

Beyond the seriousness of this assertion, the question that it brings back is that of the importance of economic and social conditions for determining the mindset of the society or if, on the contrary, is that mindset what would drive the economic and political decisions of a society.

Let us remember that the article opens up by reminding us the high levels of atheism and, one would say, the “won-battle” feeling of the people after so many centuries of religious domination. It is not hard to think that a highly educated society, conscious of the consequences it has lived thanks to religious creeds would show its disdain for religion in its penalization of religion-inclined politicians and in their attitudes when asked about religious matters. What results difficult to think is that due to the social and economic tensions of the last decade the only visible way out is a return to religion.

The article talks about the failures of “technocracy”, but perhaps what it misses is the power of the ideology behind those easy answers offered by religion. Here, the fight should not be fought by technocracy but, instead, a real heavyweight which is the western thought developed over so many centuries and so many great minds, i.e, the western philosophy. British politicians would make a serious mistake if they are driven by social and economic problems to look for more religion instead of looking for a really rational thought and a serious understanding about the real problems of their society. Moreover, it can set a very bad precedent for less-developed societies that tend to rush to copy what is done in the more developed ones.

on urban-ecological-governance...

2009-07-30T12:14:00.000-07:00

The city is multi-causal. It directs flows of humans, flora, fauna, minerals, and energy. The city is also constituted and catalyzed by these same components. This symbiotic relationship involves over half of all humans on the planet. Yet, a unified and comprehensive theory of its evolution, organization, and construction remains elusive. This is mainly due to the heterogeneous quality of cities. There is, however, a specie-like or familial-like evolutionary tree that could serve as a theoretical model for analysis. Further, there are certain patterns and markers that allow for one to explain recurring phenomenon with a degree of accuracy.

Specifically, there are certain institutions that guide humans to design, plan, and develop cities along a discernible trajectory. Institutions are often reactions to the evolution, organization, and construction of cities. Once in place, however, the institutions then help structure the city. Human, flora, fauna, mineral, and energy flows are constrained to a point by these institutions and structures. Evolution, therefore, is partially designed.

At certain key moments, however, events unfold that drastically alter the trajectory of a city’s evolution. We might think of this as being similar to the punctuated equilibrium theory within the biological sciences. Floods, earthquakes, epidemics, famines, wars, etc. can change a city almost overnight. These large-scale crises test the quality of institutions to the utmost. Those that best help manage crises must be understood; and institutions that can help to prevent or mitigate them must be constructed. For when cities fall, countries and civilization often follow.

What sort of institutions do you think are the most important for better urban-ecological-governance?

on power

2009-07-24T08:22:00.000-07:00

Is it possible to effectively and efficiently manage the endless forces at work in the world? What sort of power would be necessary?

Do any States have enough power?

Does any collection of States, or the United Nations have enough power?

At present, it seems unrealistic to imagine any of the above adequately managing even the social forces at play in our world. There are webs of social forces connecting with other webs, and webs on top of webs. Some of these have more power to influence events than others. Yet, all have the potential power to influence global events.

These webs may or may not contain States. Yet in many contexts, even those not containing States can be considered "powers." Thus, there are many powers in the world, not all equal, but all with enough power to influence events. Many powers perceived to be relatively inconsequential can produce great effects.

We often misperceive the forces at work in the world. Much of the blame goes to our intelligence, however, it also seems clear that the complexities of the system may be too difficult for any social organization to manage.

If this is true, then what are we to do? How could we construct better organizations to deal with the complex powers interacting across the globe? Should we even try?

Any thoughts?

on John Maynard Keynes

2009-07-11T12:45:00.000-07:00

“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”
- John Maynard Keynes

Few academics become historical figures, but John Maynard Keynes is a notable exception. Although he eventually worked in the upper echelons of the British government, Keynes was first and foremost a scholar and theorist of the highest order. His mathematical prowess equaled his ability to articulate complex economic concepts in readable prose, which allowed him to not only understand and solve intricate economic problems, but explain them to a broad audience. This latter skill was perhaps most important to his impact on policy, because Keynes could publicly engage in his era’s epic policy debates. In virtually all important economic policy debates from World War I to the end of World War II Keynes’ voice was critical. He defines a “public intellectual.”

Keynes questioned traditional economic assumptions, and directly challenged those parroting conventional wisdom. He was often ahead of the curve in predicting various policy outcomes. Yet, it was Keynes ideas on the role of the government in the economy that are perhaps his most lasting legacy. He advocated for a much more interventionist State than most classical economists. Keynes wanted to transform the role of the State in the economy, and thought the government should work towards a goal of “full employment.”

During the Great Depression Keynes followed the situation in the United States closely, and he argued for relatively massive government spending in order to put people back to work. President Roosevelt had already increased spending, however, in an open letter to Roosevelt published on New Year’s Ever 1933, Keynes challenged him to do more. Keynes dramatically stated, “You have made yourself the trustee for those in every country who seek to mend the evils of our condition by reasoned experiment within the framework of the existing social system. If you fail, rational change will be gravely prejudiced throughout the world, leaving orthodoxy and revolution to fight it out.” Thus, Keynes injected himself into U.S. history at a crucial time, and added another voice to the discourse on the role of the State in the American economy.

Yet, Roosevelt seemed unpersuaded by Keynes advice to stimulate job growth through more deficit spending. Throughout the 1930’s, unemployment averaged over 17 percent in the United States. Yet total government spending as a share of the economy stayed just under 20 percent for the entire decade. Things seem to turn around a bit in 1935, however, following the creation of the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Wagner Act, and the Social Security Act. The WPA is often portrayed as an example of “Keynesian” economics, and many attribute much of the subsequent rise in employment to this and other similar ideas and institutions.

By 1942 total government spending as a share of the economy rose to 52 percent, and peaked at almost 70 percent in 1944 – when unemployment fell to 1 percent. For many, this not only vindicated “Keynesian economics,” but also a more active role for the State in capitalist economies.

For decades following World War II, Keynes ideas heavily influenced US economic policy. President Nixon even declared in the early 1970’s that, “we are all Keynesians now.” Most Americans accepted government intervention in the economy, at least up to a point. Yet, things changed as a new voice began to have a tremendous impact on economic policy debates – Milton Friedman. Friedman blamed Keynesian policies as major reason for the stagflation of the 1970’s. He argued for a return to more laissez-faire approach, and argued monetary policy was the key to a healthy economy. For one reason or another, Friedman ascended and Keynes descended.

Following the most recent economic collapse, however, Keynes is making something of a comeback. The recent recession is leading to a rediscovery of Keynes, and especially his ideas about government spending during an economic crisis. Paul Krugman, and others are bringing Keynes’ voice back into the critical economic policy debates of today. In fact, what Krugman is advising the new President virtually echoes what Keynes wrote Roosevelt.

Keynes argues for a series of policies that shed light on his thinking about the role of the State in the economy. According to Keynes,

“In the field of domestic policy, I put in the forefront, for the reasons given above, a large volume of loan expenditure under government auspices. It is beyond my province to choose particular objects of expenditure. But preference should be given to those which can be made to mature quickly on a large scale, as, for example, the rehabilitation of the physical condition of the railroads. The object is to start the ball rolling.”

Keynes thought large-scale public infrastructure projects would be the best use of the government money, and he became forever linked with his advocacy for “public works.” This recommendation sounds eerily familiar. Keynes advice to Roosevelt mirrors Krugman’s advice to President Obama regarding the recent government stimulus package.

Keynes, however, also suggested creating “the maintenance of cheap and abundant credit,” by reducing the rate of interest on long-term government bonds to 2.5 percent or less. He argued this would have “favorable repercussions on the whole bond market, if only the Federal Reserve System would replace its present holdings of short-dated Treasury issues by purchasing long-dated issues in exchange.” Thus Keynes also advised monetary policies that many historians seem to overlook. Although his emphasis on public works projects receives most of the attention, Keynes also saw the value in the State regulation of the flow of credit.

Keynes als openly challenged Roosevelt to not only improve the economy, but to transform the modern State. Keynes suggested, “With these adaptations or enlargements of your existing policies, I should expect a successful outcome with great confidence. How much that would mean, not only to the material prosperity of the United States and the whole world, but in comfort to men’s minds through a restoration of their faith in the wisdom and the power of government!” For the most part, however, this call to action seemed to go unheeded.

Thus, Keynes seems to end at a sort of middle position. Keynes seemed to envision a State that governs somewhere between laissez faire and communism. Not completely planned, but not unregulated. Perhaps, a State that keeps full employment as its core economic goal, however, it does not nationalize all industries to meet that goal. Certain jobs should be created by the government, but not all jobs. More importantly, the State should view itself as the investor of last resort. If business’ lose too much of their confidence in investing, then the State should try to raise confidence by providing definitive investments in public infrastructure. The multiplier effect of the jobs created by this spending, can eventually offset debts incurred through deficit spending. This seems to be the general idea proposed by Keynes, and as mentioned above, these principles seemed to guide US policy for decades.

Keynes wrote:

“I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.”

Surely the ideas presented by Keynes are some of the most consequential in American history. Once again, the phrase “we are all Keynsians” is heard repeated. The sales of General Theory are increasing, and policy makers seem to be parroting Keynesian principles. The rediscovery of problem solving ideas often proves their worth. Further, institutions are built upon ideas, and they structure the evolution of civilization. Today, there are many institutions founded on Keynesian principles, and more will be constructed tomorrow.

On the evils of terrorism

2009-07-09T06:58:00.000-07:00

"A huge explosion in a truck Thursday killed 24 people south of Kabul, including 16 schoolchildren, 4 policemen and 4 bystanders, local officials said, as the death toll among foreign soldiers fighting in Afghanistan rose.

The explosion, which also wounded five civilians, happened in Logar Province when a truck loaded with wood turned over. When the police arrived, militants apparently detonated explosives in the vehicle, causing a blast that scattered debris almost a mile from the scene, officials said.

Attiqullah Lodin, the governor of the province, said that the children had gathered near the overturned truck and were killed when the blast went off. 'Sixteen schoolchildren aged 8 to 12 were killed along with policemen and other civilians,' Mr. Lodin said. He said two shops close to the blast were completely destroyed and rescue crews were working to try to find victims trapped under the rubble. He predicted that the death toll could rise."

Yesterday, I wrote about civilian casualties caused by US/ISAF airstrikes. Today, however, it seems necessary to also comment on the killing of innocents perpertrated by those fighting against the US/ISAF and Afghan government.

The attack described above would likely be considered immoral by most people. Although the attack had the intent of killing Afghan police, children were killed indiscriminately in the blast. The deaths of the civilians are predictable in such bombings, and it defies reason to suggest otherwise.

The militants seem willing to sacrifice civilians in order to achieve their larger goals. In other words, according to them, the ends justify the means. Yet, could their larger goals be achieved through other means?

Philosophers have long found justifications for violence. Generally, the basic assumption is that in order to survive sometimes one must resort to killing. The ends justify the means. Furthermore, according to many philosophers of war, those who reject violent means, such as pacifists, also typically give up hope of overcoming an aggressor.

Yet, there is a strain of pacifist thought that believes self-defense can be achieved through non-violent means. M. K. Gandhi embraced absolute non-violence, however, he believed this did not mean complete passivity.

Gandhi’s philosophy of “non-violent resistance,” or Satyagraha, became the ideological underpinning of a massive social movement that not only achieved its ends, but also left history with an example of how to overcome a powerful adversary through non-violent means. This example changed the course of not only Indian history but also the world’s, as leaders like Martin Luther King and others used non-violent resistance to achieve their ends. Based upon this success, people might reconsider many of the traditional justifications for violence.

Gandhi believed that, “We reap exactly as we sow,” and he argued that using brute force to achieve one’s goals only perpetuates the cycle of violence. He went on to say, “The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree.” Gandhi wanted to not just free Indians from British rule; he wanted to eliminate all violence. This rather simple notion, however, is extremely difficult to put into practice in a world plagued by violence. Yet, if the cycle of violence is to be broken, then non-violent means of opposition may be necessary.

According to Gandhi’s concept of non-violent resistance, one actively resists “evil” through non-cooperation and civil disobedience. He wrote, “You can govern us only so long as we remain the governed.” For Gandhi, and the Indian independence movement this idea came to mean mass resistance to English rule of India. This resistance came in many forms: boycotts of goods, courts, schools and legislatures, and running parallel institutions to perform these functions, non-payment of taxes, strikes, and more.

Non-violent resistance, however, also occurred through the willing acceptance of jailings, beatings, and even death. He called on his followers to be non-violent “soldiers,” willing to die for their cause. For Gandhi the ends justified the means. He believed that empathy for those jailed, beaten, and killed would elicit pity from the oppressors; and that they would eventually see the evil in their actions.

Gandhi thought that, “the force of love and pity is infinitely greater than the force of arms.” Empathy, truth, and love are fundamental to human nature, according to Gandhi, and they are the driving force of world history not violence. He argued, “the greatest and most unimpeachable evidence of the success of this force is to be found in the fact that, in spite of the wars of the world, it still lives on.” This long-term view allowed Gandhi to endure short-term suffering.

Which brings us back to the militants in Afghanistan. In the short-term, they may kill a few policeman and soldiers, but they also kill many innocents. The militants may frighten some who stand against them, but they surely provoke opposition as well. More importantly, they perpetuate the cycle of violence, bringing them neither peace nor freedom.

It is well past time for the militants of Afghanistan to find other means to achieve their ends.

On the paradox of airstrikes...

2009-07-08T06:28:00.000-07:00

A few thoughts on the use of airstrikes in Pakistan...

According to an article in today's NYTimes, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/world/asia/09pstan.html?_r=1&ref=global-home,

“Any operation that is seen to have some kind of United States assistance becomes deeply unpopular here,” said Mehmood Shah, a retired brigadier general and former administrator of Pakistan’s tribal areas.

"Publicly, Pakistani officials have been critical of the drone strikes, calling them a breach of the country’s sovereignty. But privately, Pakistani officials acknowledge that the attacks are useful if they avoid civilian casualties and strike militants. The Pakistani government has repeatedly asked the United States to supply Pakistan with drones to conduct attacks on its own. But opposition politicians depict the drone attacks as a major cause of public dissatisfaction with the United States."

It is interesting that now the Pakistani government seems trapped in the paradox of airstrikes. The US/ISAF has been dealing with the inherent problems of aerial bombing for years, but still has not found a way to consistently kill "the enemy" without killing "civilians." Thus, it remains unclear how effective airstrikes are in the aggregate. Although killing high level Al Qaeda leaders may be useful, killing women and children is not.

Beyond the ethical implications of civilian casualties, there also are strategic concerns. It is almost cliche to ask, "are we creating more enemies than we are killing," but the problem is that no one seems to have adequately answered the question.

In Afghanistan, there seems to be widespread condemnation of airstrikes. According to a recent article, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/world/asia/03helmand.htm,

"The mood of the Afghan people has tipped into a popular revolt in some parts of southern Afghanistan, presenting incoming American forces with an even harder job than expected in reversing military losses to the Taliban and winning over the population. Villagers in some districts have taken up arms against foreign troops to protect their homes or in anger after losing relatives in airstrikes, several community representatives interviewed said."

It is interesting, therefore, that the Pakistani government is pushing for more airstrikes, because they realize all too well the consequences of civilian casualties. They seem willing to suffer the potential long-term consequences (inspiring more militants), in order to try and prevent the short-term problem (suicide attacks that kill innocents). This seems to be the strategic dilemma: how to weigh short-term gains against potential long-term losses.

Although any parent would have a difficult time risking their child's safety today, what about next year? The strategy seems to be eliminating enough of the threat today, so that it can no longer pose a threat tomorrow. Yet, the problem remains that we have limited means of measuring the current threat, and almost no way of knowing the future threat.

Any thoughts on this problem?

McNamara and the perpetual fog of war

2009-07-07T09:12:00.000-07:00

A few thoughts on the death of Robert McNamara, the Sec of Def during the Vietnam war.

The following quote is from an article about McNamara in today's New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/us/07mcnamara.html?ref=opinion):

“What went wrong was a basic misunderstanding or misevaluation of the threat to our security represented by the North Vietnamese,” he said in his Berkeley oral history. “It led President Eisenhower in 1954 to say that if Vietnam were lost, or if Laos and Vietnam were lost, the dominoes would fall.” He continued, “I am certain we exaggerated the threat.”

The parallels between the Vietnam War and today's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are disturbing. The rational espoused by McNamara for escalating US involvement in the Vietnam War is eerily similar - and just as problematic - to the current thinking behind the "surge" in Afghanistan. Are we are again fighting in Afghanistan to "prevent the dominoes from falling," so to speak? In other words, are we so afraid of "another 9/11" that we are blind to the actual forces at work on the ground?

For example, are we (1) fighting an international terrorist network hellbent on destroying the US; or are we (2) fighting various tribal militias trying to conquer their own little fiefdoms; or are we (3) fighting multiple warlords with their own private armies, financed by competing outside interests?

If we are engaged in the first, then we should probably be actively eliminating this threat.
If we are dealing with the 2nd or 3rd, however, then we should probably rethink the strategic significance of Afghanistan to the US.
Yet, if we are confronting all three at the same time then we are caught in a maelstrom with little chance to actually control events.

I suspect it is all three, and I think we are probably deluding ourselves in thinking that our present strategy will work. But like McNamara we seem to be caught up in the fog of war, and keep charging forward blind to the consequences...

grant