on the "Obama Doctrine"

There is a lot of discussion about how the "Obama Doctrine" differs from the "Bush Doctrine." While I'm not sure that it yet qualifies as a “doctrine,” and seems like more of a case-by-case approach, the Obama administration's foreign policy in many respects is certainly quite different than the Bush approach.

The “Bush Doctrine” sought expansive ends, such as the democratic transformation of an entire region and the defeat of global terrorism; and it authorized preemptive war as means to these ends. The Obama administration has yet to articulate such a grand strategy.

Further, Obama's foreign policy decisions are being made in a very different international context. The US position in the world is quite different than when Bush launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

To begin with, the US is mired in an economic slump, and weary of war. This constrains foreign policy decision making. The American public is highly skeptical of spending money on military intervention abroad, when there are pressing financial concerns at home. Furthermore, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have made Americans far more skeptical of military intervention (public support for the mission in Afghanistan is only around 40%). Thus, broad ideological aims, such as "democratization," are far less likely to be seen as in the "national interest."

Perhaps more importantly, however, because of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US is already stretched militarily. Thus, preemptive action is less of an option than when Bush articulated his "doctrine," in 2002. Although US military capabilities are unmatched, they are not infinite.

Further, France and Britain dragged the US into a shooting war instead of the reverse. This is also partially due to the fact that the US is already heavily committed militarily. However, by seeking to enhance the legitimacy of the UNSC, rather than contesting its legitimacy, Obama seems far more committed to multilateralism than Bush.

More importantly, the US is effectively reacting to events in the Middle East, rather than catalyzing events there. The Obama administration is making decisions based upon actions by the people of in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, etc.; rather than forcing their governments to react to US actions.

For these reasons, and others, the Obama foreign policy approach is inherently different than the Bush approach. It is more multilateral, and far more reactive rather than proactive. The grand-strategy of the Bush administration was transforming the world in US interests; however, Obama's seems to be to preserve US interests in a changing world.

on the violence today in Egypt

I just saw the anti-Mubarak protesters building walls on the streets to keep back the pro-Mubarak people throwing rocks at them.

Neither the military nor the police is stepping in between the sides. Using bullets seems out of the question.

The protesters will have to defend themselves. They ultimately seem to have far greater numbers, and are building defensible perimeters.

However, they have no access to ambulances, which will be necessary for many of the injuries caused by the violence. And they are surrounded.

Regardless of what the military demands, however, the protesters seem committed to staying.

Is there anything you think the US can do to help? (see previous post for some thoughts from myself and others)

egypt and u.s.

What should "we" do about the uprising in Egypt?

Some suggest keeping relatively silent and letting the events in Egypt be controlled by Egyptians. Others argue that the U.S. government should effectively declare its support of the overthrow of the current Mubarak regime. Many suggest something of a middling position, in which the U.S. privately coerces Mubarak to leave peacefully while publicly saying relatively little beyond support for abstract democratic values.

Absent in much of the discussion seems to be what sort of leverage the U.S. actually has over the situation. There seems to be little leverage over the majority of Egyptian citizens. Much of the protest directly stems from the past three decades of U.S. Egyptian policy, which effectively amounted to subsidizing Egyptian security forces. These security forces agreed to allow access of the U.S. military, aid U.S. intelligence activities in the region, and recently help interrogate and sometimes torture Al Qaeda suspects. In return, the U.S. effectively turned a blind eye to Egyptian security forces being used to oppress domestic opposition groups. This did not go unnoticed in Egypt and beyond, and U.S. support of another authoritarian regime became evidence of imperialism. This support, however, also gives the U.S. a degree of leverage over the Egyptian military.

How should the U.S. use this leverage? One idea might be to privately tell the top military officials that they must pave the way for a legitimate national unity government and or new constitutional convention, or risk losing aid. While publicly saying that the U.S. looks forward to cooperating with the will of the Egyptian people as represented through a free and fair electoral process. It might be made clear that the U.S. does not seek to guide this process in any way.

What do you think?